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Where Do We Go From Here? 
In earlier publications in this series we looked at wheat as a crop 
and at its importance to the Great Plains and her people. 
We looked at the production and uses of wheat and the fact that 
we've grown more than we've used. We have a wheat problem. But the 
problem is not limited to the Plains nor even to the United States. 
It's a world problem. Worldwide, we either produce too much or use too 
little wheat. We reviewed the role of supply and demand and their effect 
on prices. We studied the marketing system and the place of governmental 
policy and foreign trade in wheat. 
The history of wheat is interesting. But it's not just the past that 
interests us now. What really counts is the future. 
What is that future? How do we wheat marketing system. There can 
discover it? be various degrees of governmental 
We don't! We decide-not dis- controls, or no programs at all. 
cover-the future by the choices we \ t\Te have many choices. 
make now and continue to make Any decision will have an impact 
in the years ahead! upon the Plains and her people. 
We've studied the past, and had ·wheat has been more than just 
an opportunity to study its sue- another crop-it has been the life 
cesses and mistakes. \ t\Th ere do we blood of the Plains. When we look 
go from here? at the choices, remember that they 
Some people say, "regrassing the are choices which will affect not 
Plains is the solution." Admittedly, only a crop, but also a region, and 
some wheat land in the Plains is its people. 
"marginal" and could well be re- We are looking for-and hoping 
grassed; but widespread regrassing that there exists-a course of action 
of the Plains is hardly feasible- which will result in the best use of 
either economically or in terms of resources in the Plains for the pea-
public policy. ple of the Plains and for the na-
Some people say, "let's return to tional welfare. 
'free markets'." This would mean 
removal of all production and mar-
keting controls and price supports. 
Farmers could plant as much as 
they wanted and would take their 
chances in the market. 
These are the most extreme solu-
tions. In between are a great many 
possibilities. A variety of ways may 
be used to adjust production . W e 
can try to increase use of wheat. W e 
can make improvements in the 
BEHIND THE CHOICES 
The wheat-producing n a t i o n s 
of the world have the capacity to 
grow more wheat than has been 
used. The need is to find new uses 
for the resources that have contri-
buted to over-production or to 
expand outlets for wheat. 
One possibility of increasing 
wheat us age involves lowering 
EXTENSION SERVICE 
price, but that may also mean less 
profit to producers. This is so 
because the domestic food market 
will consume a b o u t the same 
amount of wheat regardless of 
price, although there would be 
some increase in sales of wheat for 
feed and possibly for industrial and 
export uses. 
We should distinguish between 
"reserve" and "surplus" and work 
toward eliminating the surplus. 
Let's look at some of the propo-
sals to help "solve" the problem. 
We've grouped them into supply, 
use, and marketing alternatives. In 
addition to describing how the 
alternatives may work suggestions 
have been made as to their prob-
able consequences. 
We have not listed all the pos-
sible alternatives. You may sugges t 
other approaches. 
No alternative should be consid-
ered by itself. Probably the "best" 
solution will include several parts 
of one or more of the alternatives. 
Before going into alternatives we 
need answers to questions · like 
these: 
What really is the problem? 
Whom does it affect? How does 
it affect them? Does it affect them 
all alike? Why or why not? 
What are the objectives or the 
goals being sought? 
Do~s the solution take . into ac-
count all causes of the problem, or 
does it treat only the sympto~s? 
Does the solution create other 
problems? 
Are the solutions feasible-eco-
nomically and politically? 
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SUPPLY ALTERNATIVES 
We can affect the market supply 
of wheat by storage policy, income 
transfers, input andj or marketing 
restrictions, and by eliminating 
government programs. Let's exam-
ine these alternatives. 
Storage 
Wheat storage policy is deter-
mined by the answers to: 
"Bow much shall be stored?" 
"By whom?'' 
"Where?" 
In the past, storage policy has 
been governed largely by price sup-
port policy. More recently the desir-
able amount of wheat in storage 
has come under considerable dis-
cussion. 
Since we are not now using our 
full capacity to grow wheat, and, 
since many people consider carry-
over to be in excess of "reserve" 
needs, it is unlikely that develop-
ing storage policy will f a v o r 
increased storage stocks. 
To increase stocks-or even to 
continue p r e s e n t levels-storage 
means a higher or continued cost 
to the public. The producer and 
the grain handler both want maxi-
mum returns from use of their re-
sources. The taxpayer wants relief 
from high government costs. There 
are conflicts in these goals. 
How much wheat is a reasonable 
amount to have in reserve? 
Should there be different reserves 
for each class of wheat? How does 
this compare with current carry-
overs of the various classes? 
Over how long a period would 
you spread out any desired adjust-
ments? 
Who provides the storage de-
pends in part upon whether the 
stocks should be held in production 
areas or in areas of consumption. 
If the government stores wheat, it 
must own storage facilities or rent 
space from commercial interests. 
Recent action to reduce surplus 
has idled large amounts of storage 
facilities. It is estimated that pri-
vate storage capacity exceeds re-
quirements by 20 percent or more. 
Since government policy has been 
to hold most CCC stocks in private 
storage, a policy of reduced carry-
r 
over has put some firms under 
severe pressure. 
The question of "how much" 
may determine how many storage 
firms can remain in business in the 
Great Plains and elsewhere. For a 
particular firm the "who" and 
"where" of government storage may 
mean life or death. 
Increases or decreases in storage 
stocks may temporarily relieve or 
aggravate market problems. In 
either case long run problems of 
producers are not solved by storage 
policy alone. 
Who should store the wheat re-
serve? Producers? Handlers? The 
Government? 
Should government pay the stor-
age costs? If not, who? 
Where should wheat be stored-
where it's grown or where it's to 
be used? 
Decisions on storage have impli-
cations for other supply and use 
alternatives, since storage must be 
considered as a part of the total 
supply available. 
Income Transfers 
In some countries the govern-
ment pays producers the difference 
between the "support price" and 
market price. There are other ways 
to link income transfers to produc-
tion, price, or income guarantees. 
Not all income transfers need be 
paid by the public treasury. For 
instance, a system of multiple prices 
would pass costs on to the consumer 
through the market. 
Until the surplus problem is 
solved, high wheat price supports 
without some form of effective pro-
duction control are unlikely. High 
price supports and the subsequent 
storage have become too costly to 
be politically acceptable without 
effective controls. 
Support rates determine the cost 
of grain acquired by government; 
they cause more grain to be di-
verted to storage. More grain in 
storage increases CCC costs for 
storage and administration of the 
storage program. Market prices 
must go up to attract wheat to 
commercial channels, b r i n g i n g 
about a rise in consumer prices. 
We haven't had much experience 
with low price supports. Low sup-
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ports could serve as a "floor." Un-
less the supply decreased radically, 
market prices wou~d likely drop 
close to the "floor" support price, 
the price of feed grains, or the 
world wheat price-whichever were 
higher. 
Do you think price supports or 
some form of subsidy for wheat is 
necessary? 
From what you know about sup-
ply-demand relationships, how 
high do you think wheat price sup· 
ports should be? 
What effect would lower wheat 
price supports have on wheat pro-
ducers, on the Great Plains econ-
omy in general? 
Input Restrictions 
"Input" is any production item 
-credit, fertilizer, labor, land, ma-
chines, management, s e e d, etc. 
Input restrictions can take the form 
of discouraging, prohibiting, ra-
tioning or taxing the use of pro-
ductive items. 
To the extent one input can be 
substituted for another, input re-
strictions are not effective in con-
trolling production. 
Under acreage allotments, farm-
ers use more fertilizer, better seed 
and cultural practices to step up 
yields. They follow the logical self-
interest principle of making the 
best use of resources to maximize 
income. Another problem is that 
input restrictions may not result in 
the best mixture of resources. 
W'heat could be produced at a 
lower cost per unit without input 
restrictions. 
It is possible, however, to restrict 
the use of one or more inputs so 
severely that it becomes impos-
sible to compensate for the loss by 
substituting other inputs. In our 
society this is unlikely unless high 
incentives are involved, as was the 
case in land retirement. 
Attempts to control production 
through i n p u t restriction may 
affect producers differently. A re-
duction in acreage in high yielding 
areas would reduce total produc-
tion more than a similar reduction 
in areas of low yield. 
Input restrictions may also have 
different effects on the sellers of 
the various kinds of inputs. For 
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example, acreage reductions may 
lead to increases in fertilizer sales 
but decreases in machinery sales. 
Input restrictions may be either 
compulsory or voluntary. Let's take 
acreage diversion (or land retire-
ment) as an example. 
Compulsory acreage diversion re-
quires the producer to comply to 
secure benefits. If he doesn't com-
ply, he may be subject to penalties. 
Voluntary diversion is in the form 
of compensatory payments for tak-
ing land out of production. It may 
include permission to plant non-
surplus crops. Soil-conserving prac-
tices on retired or diverted land 
may be required. The same pur-
pose-reducing productive acreage 
-could even be accomplished by 
government rental, outright pur-
chase of the land, or purchase of 
production rights. 
Unless acreage diversion or land 
retirement is made economically 
attractive, farmers are not likely to 
support such a program. 
Land retirement or diversion pro-
grams are subject to many of the 
same shortcomings as restrictions 
on use of other production inputs. 
Farmers tend to farm non-di-
verted acres more intensively. 
Growers who don't take part may 
increase their production. Marginal 
farmers are more likely to take part 
in a voluntary program than those 
who farm on a larger scale or more 
efficiently. Thus, production does 
not decline as much proportion-
ately as does acreage-a criticism of 
the Soil Bank program. 
Voluntary input restrictions are 
more palatable politically to farm-
ers than are compulsory restric-
tions. 
When complementary programs, 
such as retraining and relocation, 
and resource andjor economic de-
velopment, accompany input re-
striction programs, they are more 
likely to succeed. Complementary 
programs attempt to employ the 
restricted or under-used resource 
more productively-particularly the 
human resource. 
How would uncontrolled produc-
tion affect wheat supply and prices? 
Should any restrictions be placed 
on wheat inputs? What input re-
strictions could we most effectively 
use to limit production? 
How foolproof would they be-
would they really be effective, or 
might substitution of other inputs 
reduce their effectiveness? 
Could i n p u t restrictions be 
achieved voluntarily or would sub-
s i d i e s-even compulsion-be re-
quired? 
What are some alternative uses 
of wheat inputs? Are they economi-
cally feasible? Might these other 
uses cause problems in a new area? 
What problems? 
What complementary programs 
are needed in addition to farm ad-
justment programs? 
Marketing Restrictions 
This is an indirect approach to 
reducing output. Producers may be 
free to produce the commodity, but 
use or sale is regulated. To the 
wheat grower, this usually means 
bushel quotas. They may or may 
not be combined with input restric-
tions. 
If marketing restrictions were 
used alone, and were known before 
planting time, m o s t producers 
would attempt to gear their pro-
duction to the quota which they 
could market. In good crop years, 
farmers would store excess produc-
tion as insurance against poor crop 
years. Marketing restrictions would 
likely increase on-farm storage and 
farmers' use of bonded elevator 
storage. 
A multiple-price system would 
require some form of marketing 
quotas to assure a "fair" division 
of the market by uses. Such a pro-
gram would have been provided 
under the "yes" vote alternative of 
the 1964 wheat program. 
Equitable distribution of mar-
keting restrictions, like assigning 
input restrictions, poses a problem. 
Past history is the basis most often 
used; but this tends to freeze pro-
duction patterns and to discourage 
the most efficient use of resources. 
Marketing restrictions could be 
made negotiable. More efficient 
producers could buy marketing 
rights from less efficient growers. 
Once wheat marketing rights for 
a certain piece of land were sold, 
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that land could not be used for 
wheat production. 
Marketing rights could be as-
signed to people, rather than to 
the land. These rights would revert 
to the government when the holder 
retired from farming for any rea-
son. The government could then 
reassign or withdraw the rights. 
Such a system may not be politi-
cally attractive and could be open 
to claims of favoritism. Some varia-
tions of these procedures (i.e., nego-
tiable rights assigned to people) are 
also possible. 
Marketing restrictions would 
also affect agriculturally-related 
businesses. Grain handlers would 
have reduced business which might 
increase unit marketing costs. Sell-
ers of production inputs (such as 
fertilizer and machinery) would 
have less business. 
Historically we have been reluc-
tant to apply either input or mar-
keting restrictions with enough 
force to cut total production or 
marketing effectively over a sus-
tained period. Either method-if 
used with sufficient determination 
-or a combination of the two, 
could be effective in reducing wheat 
output. Both would have high 
costs-economically and socially. 
Could marketing restrictions 
without input controls effectively 
regulate surpluses and the flow of 
wheat to the market? 
What kind would most likely be 
effective? W o u l d subsidies be 
needed? 
Do we need to regulate both 
inputs and marketing (with or 
without subsidies) to control sup-
ply? 
What combination would be 
most effective, the most equitable 
for producers, the least likely to 
produce adverse effects on input 
suppliers, the marketing system, 
society in general? 
Could marketing restrictions be 
made effective without govern-
mental controls through such 
means as producer cooperatives? 
No Government Wheat Program 
Discussion of storage policy, 
income transfers, and input andj or 
marketing quotas has been primar-
ily concerned with the role of gov-
ernment in wheat marketing. Many 
people believe that governmental 
influence in crop production, mar-
keting and storage should be li-
mited and indirect. 
Specifically, they don' t want mar-
keting quotas or input controls. 
But often they don't rule out price 
supports at some low, disaster-pre-
venting level. 
Let's imagine a situation in 
which "the government got out of 
agricultme." Research studies give 
us some clues as to what might 
happen under "free" prices and un-
limited production. 
If "the government got out of 
agriculture," there'd be a substan-
tial drop from current wheat prices. 
At these lower prices we could ex-
pect lower farm incomes, lower 
land prices, reduced profit for agri-
culturally related businesses, re-
duced tax bases, and increased 
difficulty in financing community 
services such as roads and schools. 
Stocks now in government hands 
would offer competition to current 
production if they were thrown on 
the open market. P.L. 480 could 
still be used to deplete government-
held stocks over a several year per-
iod. 
Lower wheat prices could make 
U.S. wheat more competitive in 
the world market. Unless other 
countries changed their policies of 
protecting their own wheat grow-
ers, we couldn't take full advantage 
of a domestic price decline. 
A change in the U.S. to free 
market prices, unrestricted produc-
tion and world market competition 
would likely produce some friction 
with other major wheat exporters 
and would disrupt the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement. 
. These "ifs" would make it 
difficult for the U.S. to increase 
exports as a result of lower U.S. 
wheat prices. 
Resource adjustment would take 
place according to the relative pro-
fitability of growing wheat as com-
pared to other crops. Wheat would 
continue to be a major crop in the 
Plains, since other grains and grass 
are likely to be less profitable over 
much of the Plains. In other areas, 
more attractive alternatives may 
exist. 
Lower wheat prices and unre-
stricted wheat production would 
result in conflict with feed grain 
producers, if wheat replaced some 
feed grains as livestock feed and 
thus added to the total feed grain 
supply. The wheat problem cannot 
be solved in isolation. 
The net short run effect of a 
free market for wheat would be a 
substantial drop in wheat produc-
er's incomes. Farm consolidation 
and resource recombination would 
be speeded up. 
Long range effects are less pre-
dictable. Production would stabil-
ize at some new lfvel, but prices 
would be lower tlian at present-
unless there was a great expansion 
in demand. The ending of price 
support and storage programs 
would result in avings to tax-
payers. l 
Would you be Jftter off with a 
policy of a free market and unre-
stricted productio:rl? Immediately? 
After full adjustmept? 
How would otliers-feed grain 
and livestock producers, the grain 
trade, people in agriculturally re-
lated businesses or communities in 
the Plains-be affected by free 
prices for wheat? 
USE ALTERNATIVES 
In Fact Sheet I we discussed the 
uses of wheat: food, feed, seed, 
industrial uses, and export. What 
are the prospects for increasing 
those uses? 
Domestic Uses 
Any sizable increase in any cate-
gory of use would help relieve 
some of the pressurb on wheat sup-
plies and production capability. 
Food Use: There has been a 
downward trend in domestic per 
capita consumption of wheat for 
many years. Many new products 
using wheat have been introduced. 
Consumption subsidy plans have 
been tried. But the trend persists. 
A look at the past suggests that the 
likelihood of increased domestic 
per capita food use is small. How-
ever, new food uses developed by 
research-and aggressive merchan-
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dising of them-have helped the 
food industry prevent more dras-
tic declines in food uses. 
Feed Use: Livestock feed use 
could be expanded if the price of 
wheat were allowed to fall so that 
wheat could compete as a feed 
grain. 
Could wheat producers profitably 
sell wheat at feed grain prices (at, 
say, $1.00-$1.25 per bushel)? 
How much wheat could be mar-
keted as livestock feed without de-
pressing other feed grain and live-
stock prices? How would feed grain 
producers regard competition from 
wheat? 
Industrial Use: Prospects for 
increased industrial uses of wheat 
are slim. Very low wheat prices, 
subsidies, or a unique usage would 
be required before industrial use 
of wheat may be expected to 
increase. 
During recent years industry has 
developed substitutes for agricul-
tural products more often than 
agricultural products have been 
adopted for use as industrial raw 
materials. Many industrial uses of 
agricultural products developed by 
research have never been utilized 
because there is often a great differ-
ence between what is technologi-
cally possible and what is economi-
cally feasible. 
Seed Use: This will continue to 
be minor. Only about 5 percent of 
the crop is now needed for seed. 
Exports 
U.S. wheat exports have exceeded 
600 million bushels in recent years 
and may reach 900 million in 
1963-64. Crop failures in Western 
Europe and Russia in 1963 caused 
a sharp, but temporary, increase in 
export demand. 
Continued sales of wheat to 
Russia and her satellites in Eastern 
Europe will depend upon whether 
food shortages persist because of 
deep-seated agricultural problems, 
and upon governmental policies of 
importing and exporting nations. 
Some people feel we've missed 
good bets for increasing our exports 
even more. For example, the U.S.-
following its policy of not recog-
nizing Red China, hasn't attempted 
to negotiate w h e a t trade with 
( 
China. Australia and Canada have 
sold several million tons of wheat 
to the Red Chinese. 
What would the U.S. have lost 
or gained if we had sold wheat to 
China? Did the action of Canada 
and Australia ease competition for 
other markets? 
Do the foreign policy issues 
involved conflict with agricultural 
trade policy? Which is more impor-
tant? 
Our most important cash cus-
tomers for wheat have been Japan, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. 
The largest recipients of wheat 
under our special programs have 
been India, Egypt and Pakistan. 
We have really been doing rather 
well with wheat and flour exports 
in recent years. Yet our very suc-
cess in exporting wheat has brought 
problems. 
Less than one-third of our recent 
exports have been for cash. And 
even those have required a govern-
ment subsidy to make up the differ-
ence between domestic and world 
prices. (See Fact Sheet IV: Can We 
Export More Wheat for details.) 
The other two-thirds have also 
moved under special programs. 
At current U.S. wheat prices, 
most exports have involved costs 
to taxpayers. However justified 
these exports may be for humani-
tarian or economic development 
purposes, the importance of export 
subsidies concerns the U.S. wheat 
industry, which is dependent on 
foreign trade for about half its 
total market. 
Setting aside the effect of PL 480 
and other government programs on 
our domestic wheat "problem"-
how important is such foreign aid 
to friendly and developing nations? 
How valuable are these programs 
to U.S. foreign policy? 
Should we maintain these pro-
grams of assistance? Increase or 
decrease them? 
The capacity of less developed 
nations to import U.S. wheat is 
often limited by one or a combina-
tion of the following: 
I. Inadequate purchasing power. 
2. Dietary preferences for white 
wheat or rice. 
3. Inadequate transportation and 
storage facilities. 
4. Fear of the effect of imports 
on domestic grain production. 
5. Reluctance to become depen-
dent upon U.S. wheat without long 
term commitments from the U.S. 
6. Our interest in promoting 
economic development and inde-
pendence in some importing coun-
tries as opposed to having them 
become dependent on U.S. exports. 
Our capacity to export wheat is 
limited by one or more of the fol-
lowing: 
I. Reluctance of U.S. taxpayer to 
subsidize either the importing coun-
try or our domestic wheat industry. 
2. Concern over relations with 
other exporting countries. 
3. A grading system w h i c h 
doesn't always adequately describe 
milling and baking characteristics. 
4. Transportation costs which 
give some other countries a compe-
titive advantage. 
5. Bilateral trading agreements 
between other nations which block 
U.S. entry into some markets. 
Despite these limitations, we 
have exported more wheat than we 
have used domestically since 1960. 
What have been the key factors 
in promoting relatively large U.S. 
wheat exports? Who has benefited? 
The world wheat export prices 
have recently ranged between $1.15 
to $1.55 on the farm. Would prices 
in this range enable U.S. wheat 
growers to produce for export at 
a profit? 
What limitations are placed on 
"free" foreign wheat trade? What 
can or should we do about them? 
What modifications are advisable 
and practicable in U.S. wheat ex-
porting policies, the International 
Wheat Agreement, etc., to insure 
continued high-or increased-ex-
ports? 
MARKETING ALTERNATIVES 
OR ADJUSTMENTS 
How much wheat finds its way 
into both domestic and foreign use 
is partially dependent on the effec-
tiveness of our marketing efforts. 
Thus, no look at alternatives would 
be complete without an inspection 
of some of the ways people have 
suggested the market system could 
be improved. Since most of these 
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alternatives have been discussed in 
Fact Sheet II they will not be re-
peated here. 
One aspect of marketing, pric-
ing policy, merits more treatment 
here. We have already talked about 
high and low prices for wheat, so 
let us turn to a kind of in-between, 
multiple pricing. 
Multiple Pricing Systems: Multi-
ple pricing systems for wheat ac-
cording to end use, similar to the 
pricing of milk, have been pro-
posed. In part, wheat is priced 
under such a system now that ex-
port prices are lower than domes-
tic wheat prices. Multiple pricing 
proposals would systematize the 
price differences among the various 
uses for wheat. 
It would be difficult to maintain 
separate stocks of the same type of 
wheat for different uses. It would, 
for example, be difficult to prevent 
a buyer of low-priced feed or indus-
trial use wheat from reselling the 
wheat for higher priced food uses. 
Multiple pricing would require 
that differential prices be estab-
lished by mutual consent or law 
and maintained by strict controls. 
Without rigid controls, higher 
prices would tend to fall toward 
the lower levels. 
Prices of wheat for feed use 
would have to be competitive with 
prices of feed grains. If corn sold 
at $1.20 per bushel, wheat would 
be priced between $1.08 and $1.35, 
depending on the class of livestock. 
Wheat could be fed to cattle or 
hogs at the higher range, and to 
lambs at the lower range. 
Prices of wheat for industrial 
uses would have to be even lower 
than feed use prices if wheat were 
to be competitive as an industrial 
raw material. 
Prices of wheat for domestic food 
uses could be set at relatively high 
levels. This would require an im-
portant policy decision, whether or 
not to continue favored treatment 
of wheat for food. We don't favor 
corn going into cornflakes, but do 
favor milk for fluid consumption 
as compared with "manufacturing" 
milk. 
Prices for commercial wheat ex-
ports would probably be near 
"world" or International Wheat 
Agreement price levels. Diverting 
more wheat to export, industrial or 
feed uses would lessen surplus 
pressure and would reduce storage 
costs. 
Multiple pricing attempts to 
raise farm income by taking advan-
tage of the different demand elasti-
cities for wheat in various uses. 
(See Fact Sheet II). The income 
transfer would be made through 
the market rather than by govern-
ment. 
How best could a multiple pric-
ing system be operated? 
Do any of these domestic use ex-
. pansion programs offer much hope 
for increasing use of wheat or im-
proving prices or net incomes 
of wheat growers? What would be 
the effect on other segments of our 
economy? 
THE OUTLOOK FOR WHEAT, 
PEOPLE AND THE PLAINS 
Changes in wheat production, 
transportation, storage and market-
ing methods can be expected. Ver-
tical and horizontal coordination, 
government programs, contract ar-
rangements and direct buying, rail 
rates, highway systems, overseas 
outlets, methods of storage, and 
utilization research-all these things 
will affect the flow of wheat 
through marketing channels in the 
future. 
Improvement in any aspect of 
wheat commerce will help. Combi-
nations of improvements will help 
more. Improvements will take time. 
They will take concerted efforts. All 
problems will not Qe solved at once. 
Which Way Now? 
If nothing else were affected, it 
would be-at least in the short run 
-to the advantage of the Plains and 
her people to grow and export as 
much wheat as possible. But other 
producers, other regions and other 
nations are affected. 
The decision on how much to 
grow and export, how high the 
price should be, and many other 
questions involve national and in-
ternational policy considerations. 
Basically the choices we face are 
to (1) increase domestic uses and 
exports or (2) reduce production. 
Either could produce benefits; both 
would involve costs. 
Which way and how far do we 
go? 
This our nation-through the 
democratic process-must answer. 
Even so, governmental action alone 
can't solve all the problems or im-
plement all the needed changes. 
What can and should you-the 
producer, the Main Street business-
man, the professional man, the 
technician, the artisan, the laborer, 
the ·· machinery ge<;tler, the local 
government official, the elevator 
operator, the grain exporter, the 
miller-do to help deveJop a better 
future for the Plains and her 
people? 
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